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Abstract. Face modification systems using deep learning have become
increasingly powerful and accessible. Given images of a person’s face,
such systems can generate new images of that same person under dif-
ferent expressions and poses. Some systems can also modify targeted
attributes such as hair color or age. This type of manipulated images
and video have been coined Deepfakes. In order to prevent a malicious
user from generating modified images of a person without their consent
we tackle the new problem of generating adversarial attacks against such
image translation systems, which disrupt the resulting output image. We
call this problem disrupting deepfakes. Most image translation architec-
tures are generative models conditioned on an attribute (e.g. put a smile
on this person’s face). We are first to propose and successfully apply (1)
class transferable adversarial attacks that generalize to different classes,
which means that the attacker does not need to have knowledge about
the conditioning class, and (2) adversarial training for generative adver-
sarial networks (GANs) as a first step towards robust image translation
networks. Finally, in gray-box scenarios, blurring can mount a success-
ful defense against disruption. We present a spread-spectrum adversarial
attack, which evades blur defenses.
Keywords: adversarial attacks, image translation, face modification,
deepfake, generative models, GAN, privacy
1 Introduction
Advances in image translation using generative adversarial networks (GANs)
have allowed the rise of face manipulation systems that achieve impressive real-
ism. Some face manipulation systems can create new images of a person’s face
under different expressions and poses [19, 28]. Other face manipulation systems
modify the age, hair color, gender or other attributes of the person [5, 6].
Given the widespread availability of these systems, malicious actors can mod-
ify images of a person without their consent. There have been occasions where
faces of celebrities have been transferred to videos with explicit content with-
out their consent [1] and companies such as Facebook have banned uploading
modified pictures and video of people [2].
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Fig. 1: Illustration of deepfake disruption with a real example. After applying an
imperceptible filter on the image using our I-FGSM disruption the output of the
face manipulation system (StarGAN [5]) is successfully disrupted.
One way of mitigating this risk is to develop systems that can detect whether
an image or video has been modified using one of these systems. There have been
recent efforts in this direction, with varying levels of success [24,25].
There is work showing that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks [4, 10, 18, 21], where an attacker applies imperceptible perturbations to
an image causing it to be incorrectly classified. We distinguish different attack
scenarios. In a white-box scenario the attacker has perfect knowledge of the
architecture, model parameters and defenses in place. In a black-box scenario,
the attacker is only able to query the target model for output labels for chosen
inputs. There are several different definitions of gray-box scenarios. In this work,
a gray-box scenario denotes perfect knowledge of the model and parameters, but
ignorance of the pre-processing defense mechanisms in place (such as blurring).
We focus on white-box and gray-box settings.
Another way of combating malicious actors is by disrupting the deepfaker’s
ability to generate a deepfake. In this work we propose a solution by adapting
traditional adversarial attacks that are imperceptible to the human eye in the
source image, but interfere with translation of this image using image transla-
tion networks. A successful disruption corresponds to the generated image being
sufficiently deteriorated such that it has to be discarded or such that the modi-
fication is perceptually evident. We present a formal and quantifiable definition
of disruption success in Section 3.
Most facial manipulation architectures are conditioned both on the input
image and on a target conditioning class. One example, is to define the target
expression of the generated face using this attribute class (e.g. put a smile on
the person’s face). In this example, if we want to prevent a malicious actor
from putting a smile on the person’s face in the image, we need to know that
the malicious actor has selected the smile attribute instead of, for instance,
eye closing. In this work, we are first to formalize the problem of disrupting
class conditional image translation, and present two variants of class transferable
disruptions that improve generalization to different conditioning attributes.
Disrupting DeepFakes 3
Fig. 2: An example of our deepfake disruptions on StarGAN [5] and GANima-
tion [19]. Some image translation networks are more prone to disruption.
Blurring is a broken defense in the white-box scenario, where a disruptor
knows the type and magnitude of pre-processing blur being used. Nevertheless,
in a real situation, a disruptor might know the architecture being used yet ignore
the type and magnitude of blur being used. In this scenario the efficacy of a naive
disruption drops dramatically. We present a novel spread-spectrum disruption
that evades a variety of blur defenses in this gray-box setting.
In summary:
– We present baseline methods for disrupting deepfakes by adapting adversar-
ial attack methods to image translation networks.
– We are the first to address disruptions on conditional image translation net-
works. We propose and evaluate novel disruption methods that transfer from
one conditioning class to another.
– We are the first to propose and evaluate adversarial training for generative
adversarial networks. Our novel G+D adversarial training alleviates disrup-
tions in a white-box setting.
– We propose a novel spread-spectrum disruption that evades blur defenses in
a gray-box scenario.
2 Related Work
There are several works exploring image translation using deep neural net-
works [5, 6, 11, 19, 26, 28, 29]. Some of these works apply image translation to
face images in order to generate new images of individuals with modified expres-
sion or attributes [5, 6, 19,28].
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There is a large amount of work that explores adversarial attacks on deep
neural networks for classification [4, 10, 15–18, 21]. Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM), a one-step gradient attack was proposed by Goodfellow et al. [10].
Stronger iterative attacks such as iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) [13] and Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) [14] have been proposed. Sabour et al. [20] explore
feature-space attacks on deep neural network classifiers using L-BFGS.
Tabacof et al. [22] and Kos et al. [12] explore adversarial attacks against
Variational Autoencoders (VAE) and VAE-GANs, where an adversarial image
is compressed into a latent space and instead of being reconstructed into the
original image is reconstructed into an image of a different semantic class. In
contrast, our work focuses on attacks against image translation systems. Addi-
tionally, our objective is to disrupt deepfake generation as opposed to changing
the output image to a different semantic class.
Wang et al. [23] adapt adversarial attacks to the image translation scenario
for traffic scenes on the pix2pixHD and CycleGAN networks. Yeh et al. [27],
is concurrent work to ours, and proposes adapting PGD to attack pix2pixHD
and CycleGAN networks in the face domain. Most face manipulation networks
are conditional image translation networks, [23,27] do not address this scenario
and do not explore defenses for such attacks. We are the first to explore attacks
against conditional image translation GANs as well as attacks that transfer to
different conditioning classes. We are also the first to propose adversarial train-
ing [14] for image translation GANs. Madry et al. [14] propose adversarial train-
ing using strong adversaries to alleviate adversarial attacks against deep neural
network classifiers. In this work, we propose two adaptations of this technique
for GANs, as a first step towards robust image translation networks.
A version of spread-spectrum watermarking for images was proposed by Cox
et al. [8]. Athalye et al. [3] proposes the expectation over transformation (EoT)
method for synthesizing adversarial examples robust to pre-processing transfor-
mations. However, Athalye et al. [3] demonstrate their method on affine trans-
formations, noise and others, but do not consider blur. In this work, we propose
a faster heuristic iterative spread-spectrum disruption for evading blur defenses.
3 Method
We describe methods for image translation disruption (Section 3.1), our proposed
conditional image translation disruption techniques (Section 3.2), our proposed
adversarial training techniques for GANs (Section 3.3) and our proposed spread-
spectrum disruption (Section 3.4).
3.1 Image Translation Disruption
Similar to an adversarial example, we want to generate a disruption by adding
a human-imperceptible perturbation η to the input image:
x˜ = x+ η, (1)
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where x˜ is the generated disrupted input image and x is the input image. By
feeding the original image or the disrupted input image to a generator we have
the mappings G(x) = y and G(x˜) = y˜, respectively, where y and y˜ are the
translated output images and G is the generator of the image translation GAN.
We consider a disruption successful when it introduces perceptible corrup-
tions or modifications onto the output y˜ of the network leading a human observer
to notice that the image has been altered and therefore distrust its source.
We operationalize this phenomenon. Adversarial attack research has focused
on attacks showing low distortions using the L0, L2 and L∞ distance metrics.
The logic behind using attacks with low distortion is that the larger the distance,
the more apparent the alteration of the image, such that an observer could detect
it. In contrast, we seek to maximize the distortion of our output, with respect
to a well-chosen reference r.
max
η
L(G(x+ η), r), subject to ||η||∞ ≤ , (2)
where  is the maximum magnitude of the perturbation and L is a distance
function. If we pick r to be the ground-truth output, r = G(x), we get the ideal
disruption which aims to maximize the distortion of the output.
We can also formulate a targeted disruption, which pushes the output y˜ to
be close to r:
η = arg min
η
L(G(x+ η), r), subject to ||η||∞ ≤ . (3)
Note that the ideal disruption is a special case of the targeted disruption
where we minimize the negative distortion instead and select r = G(x). We can
thus disrupt an image towards a target or away from a target.
We can generate a targeted disruption by adapting well-established adversar-
ial attacks: FGSM, I-FGSM, and PGD. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10]
generates an attack in one forward-backward step, and is adapted as follows:
η =  sign[∇xL(G(x), r)], (4)
where  is the size of the FGSM step. Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-
FGSM) [13] generates a stronger adversarial attack in multiple forward-backward
steps. We adapt this method for the targeted disruption scenario as follows:
x˜t = clip(x˜t−1 − a sign[∇x˜L(G(x˜t−1), r)]), (5)
where a is the step size and the constraint ||x˜−x||∞ ≤  is enforced by the clip
function. For disruptions away from the target r instead of towards r, using the
negative gradient of the loss in the equations above is sufficient. For an adapted
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [14], we initialize the disrupted image x˜0
randomly inside the -ball around x and use the I-FGSM update function.
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3.2 Conditional Image Translation Disruption
Many image translation systems are conditioned not only on the input image,
but on a target class as well:
y = G(x, c), (6)
where x is the input image, c is the target class and y is the output image. A
target class can be an attribute of a dataset, for example blond or brown-haired.
A disruption for the data/class pair (x, ci) is not guaranteed to transfer to
the data/class pair (x, cj) when i 6= j. We can define the problem of looking for
a class transferable disruption as follows:
η = arg min
η
Ec[L(G(x+ η, c), r)], subject to ||η||∞ ≤ . (7)
We can write this empirically as an optimization problem:
η = arg min
η
∑
c
[L(G(x+ η, c), r)], subject to ||η||∞ ≤ . (8)
Iterative Class Transferable Disruption In order to solve this problem, we
present a novel disruption on class conditional image translation systems that
increases the transferability of our disruption to different classes. We perform a
modified I-FGSM disruption:
x˜t = clip(x˜t−1 − a sign[∇x˜L(G(x˜t−1, ck), r)]). (9)
We initialize k = 1 and increment k at every iteration, until we reach k = K
where K is the number of classes. We then reset k = 1.
Joint Class Transferable Disruption We propose a disruption which seeks
to minimize the expected value of the distance to the target r at every step t.
For this, we compute this loss term at every step of an I-FGSM disruption and
use it to inform our update step:
x˜t = clip(x˜t−1 − a sign[∇x˜
∑
c
L(G(x˜t−1, c), r)]). (10)
3.3 GAN Adversarial Training
Adversarial training for classifier deep neural networks was proposed by Madry et
al. [14]. It incorporates strong PGD attacks on the training data for the classifier.
We propose the first adaptations of adversarial training for generative adversarial
networks. Our methods, described below, are a first step in attempting to defend
against image translation disruption.
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Generator Adversarial Training A conditional image translation GAN uses
the following adversarial loss:
L = Ex [logD(x)] + Ex,c[log (1−D(G(x, c)))], (11)
where D is the discriminator. In order to make the generator resistant to adver-
sarial examples, we train the GAN using the modified loss:
L = Ex [logD(x)] + Ex,c,η[log (1−D(G(x+ η, c)))]. (12)
Generator+Discriminator (G+D) Adversarial Training Instead of only
training the generator to be indifferent to adversarial examples, we also train the
discriminator on adversarial examples:
L = Ex,η1 [logD(x+ η1)] + Ex,c,η2,η3 [log (1−D(G(x+ η2, c) + η3))]. (13)
3.4 Spread-Spectrum Evasion of Blur Defenses
Blurring can be an effective test-time defense against disruptions in a gray-box
scenario, where the disruptor ignores the type or magnitude of blur being used.
In order to successfully disrupt a network in this scenario, we propose a spread-
spectrum evasion of blur defenses that transfers to different types of blur. We
perform a modified I-FGSM update
x˜t = clip(x˜t−1 −  sign[∇x˜L(fk(G(x˜t−1)), r)]), (14)
where fk is a blurring convolution operation, and we have K different blurring
methods with different magnitudes and types. We initialize k = 1 and increment
k at every iteration of the algorithm, until we reach k = K where K is the total
number of blur types and magnitudes. We then reset k = 1.
4 Experiments
In this section we demonstrate that our proposed image-level FGSM, I-FGSM
and PGD-based disruptions are able to disrupt different recent image transla-
tion architectures such as GANimation [19], StarGAN [5], pix2pixHD [26] and
CycleGAN [29]. In Section 4.1, we show that the ideal formulation of an image-
level disruption presented in Section 3.1, is the most effective at producing large
distortions in the output. In Section 4.2, we demonstrate that both our iterative
class transferable disruption and joint class transferable disruption are able to
transfer to different conditioning classes. In Section 4.3, we test our disruptions
against two defenses in a white-box setting. We show that our proposed G+D
adversarial training is most effective at alleviating disruptions, although strong
disruptions are able to overcome this defense. Finally, in Section 4.4 we show
that blurring is an effective defense against disruptions in a gray-box setting, in
which the disruptor does not know the type or magnitude of the pre-processing
blur. We then demonstrate that our proposed spread-spectrum adversarial dis-
ruption evades different blur defenses in this scenario. All disruptions in our
experiments use L = L2.
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Fig. 3: Equivalence scale between L2 and L1 distances and qualitative distortion
on disrupted StarGAN images. We also show the original image and output with
no disruption. Images with L2 ≥ 0.05 have very noticeable distortions.
Architectures and Datasets We use the GANimation [19], StarGAN [6],
pix2pixHD [26] and CycleGAN [29] image translation architectures. We use
an open-source implementation of GANimation trained for 37 epochs on the
CelebA dataset for 80 action units (AU) from the Facial Action Unit Coding
System (FACS) [9]. We test GANimation on 50 random images from the CelebA
dataset (4,000 disruptions). We use the official open-source implementation of
StarGAN, trained on the CelebA dataset for the five attributes black hair, blond
hair, brown hair, gender and aged. We test StarGAN on 50 random images from
the CelebA dataset (250 disruptions). For pix2pixHD we use the official open-
source implementation, which was trained for label-to-street view translation on
the Cityscapes dataset [7]. We test pix2pixHD on 50 random images from the
Cityscapes test set. For CycleGAN we use the official open-source implemen-
tation for both the zebra-to-horses and photograph-to-Monet painting transla-
tions. We disrupt 100 images from both datasets. We use the pre-trained models
provided in the open-source implementations, unless specifically noted.
4.1 Image Translation Disruption
Success Scenario In order to develop intuition on the relationship between
our main L2 and L1 distortion metrics and the qualitative distortion caused on
image translations, we display in Fig. 3 a scale that shows qualitative examples
of disrupted outputs and their respective distortion metrics. We can see that
when the L2 and L1 metric becomes larger than 0.05 we have very noticeable
distortions in the output images. Throughout the experiments section, we report
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Table 1: Comparison of L1 and L2 pixel-wise errors, as well as the percentage of
disrupted images (% dis.) for different disruption methods on different facial ma-
nipulation architectures and datasets. All disruptions use  = 0.05 unless noted.
We notice that strong disruptions are successful on all tested architectures.
FGSM I-FGSM PGD
Architecture (Dataset) L1 L2 % dis. L1 L2 % dis. L1 L2 % dis.
StarGAN (CelebA) 0.462 0.332 100% 1.134 1.525 100% 1.119 1.479 100%
GANimation (CelebA) 0.090 0.017 0% 0.142 0.046 34.9% 0.139 0.044 30.4%
GANimation (CelebA,  = 0.1) 0.121 0.024 1.5% 0.212 0.098 93.9% 0.190 0.077 83.7%
pix2pixHD (Cityscapes) 0.240 0.118 96% 0.935 1.110 100% 0.922 1.084 100%
CycleGAN (Horse) 0.133 0.040 21% 0.385 0.242 100% 0.402 0.253 100%
CycleGAN (Monet) 0.155 0.039 22% 0.817 0.802 100% 0.881 0.898 100%
the percentage of successfully disrupted images (% dis.), which correspond to the
percentage of outputs presenting a distortion L2 ≥ 0.05.
Vulnerable Image Translation Architectures We show that we are able to
disrupt the StarGAN, pix2pixHD and CycleGAN architectures with very suc-
cessful results using either I-FGSM or PGD in Table 1. Our white-box disrup-
tions are effective on several recent image translation architectures and several
different translation domains. GANimation reveals itself to be more robust to
disruptions of magnitude  = 0.05 than StarGAN, although it can be successfully
disrupted with stronger disruptions ( = 0.1). The metrics reported in Table 1
are the average of the L1 and L2 errors on all dataset samples, where we compute
the error for each sample by comparing the ground-truth output G(x) with the
disrupted output G(x˜), using the following formulas L1 = ||G(x˜)−G(x)||1 and
L2 = ||G(x˜)−G(x)||2. For I-FGSM and PGD we use 20 steps with step size of
0.01. We use our ideal formulation for all disruptions.
We show examples of successfully disrupted image translations on GANi-
mation and StarGAN in Fig. 2 using I-FGSM. We observe different qualita-
tive behaviors for disruptions on different architectures. Nevertheless, all of our
disruptions successfully make the modifications in the image obvious for any
observer, thus avoiding any type of undetected manipulation of an image.
Ideal Disruption In Section 3.1, we derived an ideal disruption for our success
metric. In order to execute this disruption we first need to obtain the ground-
truth output of the image translation network G(x) for the image x being dis-
rupted. We push the disrupted output G(x˜) to be maximally different from
G(x). We compare this ideal disruption (designated as Away From Output in
Table 2) to targeted disruptions with different targets such as a black image,
a white image and random noise. We also compare it to a less computation-
ally intensive disruption called Away From Input, which seeks to maximize the
distortion between our disrupted output G(x˜) and our original input x.
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Table 2: Comparison of efficacy of FGSM, I-FGSM and PGD methods with
different disruption targets for the StarGAN generator and the CelebA dataset.
FGSM I-FGSM PGD
Target L1 L2 L1 L2 L1 L2
Towards Black 0.494 0.336 0.494 0.335 0.465 0.304
Towards White 0.471 0.362 0.711 0.694 0.699 0.666
Towards Random Noise 0.509 0.409 0.607 0.532 0.594 0.511
Away From Input 0.449 0.319 1.086 1.444 1.054 1.354
Away From Output 0.465 0.335 1.156 1.574 1.119 1.480
Table 3: Comparison of our image-level PGD disruption to an adapted feature-
level disruption from Kos et al. [12] on the StarGAN architecture.
Kos et al. [12]
Layer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Ours
L1 0.367 0.406 0.583 0.671 0.661 0.622 0.573 0.554 0.512 0.489 0.778 1.066
L2 0.218 0.269 0.503 0.656 0.621 0.558 0.478 0.443 0.384 0.331 0.817 1.365
We display the results for the StarGAN architecture on the CelebA dataset
in Table 2. As expected, the Away From Output disruption is the most effective
using I-FGSM and PGD. All disruptions show similar effectiveness when using
one-step FGSM. Away From Input seems similarly effective to the Away From
Output for I-FGSM and PGD, yet it does not have to computeG(x), thus saving
one forward pass of the generator.
Finally, we show in Table 3 comparisons of our image-level Away From Out-
put disruption to the feature-level attack for Variational Autoencoders (VAE)
presented in Kos et al. [12]. Although in Kos et al. [12] attacks are only tar-
geted on the latent vector of a VAE, here we attack every possible intermediate
feature map of the image translation network using this attack. The other two
attacks presented in Kos et al. [12] cannot be applied to the image-translation
scenario. We disrupt the StarGAN architecture on the CelebA dataset. Both
disruptions use the 10-step PGD optimization formulation with  = 0.05. We
notice that while both disruptions are successful, our image-level formulation
obtains stronger distortions on average.
4.2 Class Transferable Adversarial Disruption
Class Conditional Image Translation Systems such as GANimation and Star-
GAN are conditional GANs. Both are conditioned on an input image. Addition-
ally, GANimation is conditioned on the target AU intensities and StarGAN is
conditioned on a target attribute. As the disruptor we do know which image the
malicious actor wants to modify (our image), and in some scenarios we might
know the architecture and weights that they are using (white-box disruption),
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Fig. 4: Examples of our class transferable disruptions. (a) Input image. (b) The
ground truth GANimation output without disruption. (c) A disruption using
the correct action unit correctly is successful. (d) A disruption with a incorrect
target AU is not successful. (e) Our iterative class transferable disruption and
(f) joint class transferable disruption are able to transfer across different action
units and successfully disrupt the deepfake generation.
yet in almost all cases we do not know whether they want to put a smile on the
person’s face or close their eyes, for example. Since this non-perfect knowledge
scenario is probable, we want a disruption that transfers to all of the classes in
a class conditional image translation network.
In our experiments we have noticed that attention-driven face manipulation
systems such as GANimation present an issue with class transfer. GANimation
generates a color mask as well as an attention mask designating the parts of the
image that should be replaced with the color mask.
In Fig. 4, we present qualitative examples of our proposed iterative class
transferable disruption and joint class transferable disruption. The goal of these
disruptions is to transfer to all action unit inputs for GANimation. We compare
this to the unsuccessful disruption transfer case where the disruption is targeted
to the incorrect AU. Columns (e) and (f) of Fig. 4 show our iterative class
transferable disruption and our joint class transferable disruption successfully
disrupting the deepfakes, whereas attempting to disrupt the system using the
incorrect AU is not effective (column (c)).
Quantitative results demonstrating the superiority of our proposed methods
can be found in Table 4. For our disruptions, we use 80 iterations of PGD,
magnitude  = 0.05 and a step of 0.01.
For our second experiment, presented in Table 5, instead of disrupting the
input image such that the output is visibly distorted, we disrupt the input image
such that the output is the identity. In other words, we want the input image to
be untouched by the image translation network. We use 80 iterations of I-FGSM,
magnitude  = 0.05 and a step of 0.005.
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Table 4: Class transferability results for our proposed disruptions. This disrup-
tion seeks maximal disruption in the output image. We present the distance
between the ground-truth non-disrupted output and the disrupted output im-
ages, higher distance is better.
L1 L2 % dis.
Incorrect Class 0.144 0.053 45.7%
Iterative Class Transferable 0.171 0.075 75.6%
Joint Class Transferable 0.157 0.062 53.8%
Correct Class 0.166 0.071 68.7%
Table 5: Class transferability results for our proposed disruptions. This disrup-
tion seeks minimal change in the input image. We present the distance between
the input and output images, lower distance is better.
L1 L2
Incorrect Class 1.69× 10−3 3.09× 10−4
Iterative Class Transferable 6.07× 10−4 8.02× 10−5
Joint Class Transferable 3.86× 10−4 1.67× 10−5
Correct Class 9.88× 10−5 4.73× 10−5
No Disruption 9.10× 10−2 2.15× 10−2
4.3 GAN Adversarial Training and Other Defenses
We present results for our generator adversarial training and G+D adversarial
training proposed in Section 3.3. In Table 6, we can see that generator adversar-
ial training is somewhat effective at alleviating a strong 10-step PGD disruption.
G+D adversarial training proves to be even more effective than generator ad-
versarial training.
Additionally, in the same Table 6, we present results for a Gaussian blur
test-time defense (σ = 1.5). We disrupt this blur defense in a white-box manner.
With perfect knowledge of the pre-processing, we can simply backpropagate
through that step and obtain a disruption. We achieve the biggest resistance to
disruption by combining blurring and G+D adversarial training, although strong
PGD disruptions are still relatively successful. Nevertheless, this is a first step
towards robust image translation networks.
We use a 10-step PGD ( = 0.1) for both generator adversarial training
and G+D adversarial training. We trained StarGAN for 50, 000 iterations using
a batch size of 14. We use an FGSM disruption  = 0.05, a 10-step I-FGSM
disruption  = 0.05 with step size 0.01 and a 10-step PGD disruption  = 0.05
with step size 0.01.
4.4 Spread-Spectrum Evasion of Blur Defenses
Blurring can be an effective defense against our adversarial disruptions in a
gray-box setting where the disruptor does not know the type and magnitude of
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Fig. 5: An example of a successful Gaussian blur defense on a disruption.
Table 6: Image translation disruptions on StarGAN with different defenses.
FGSM I-FGSM PGD
Defense L1 L2 % dis. L1 L2 % dis. L1 L2 % dis.
No Defense 0.489 0.377 100 0.877 1.011 100 0.863 0.981 100
Blur 0.160 0.048 37.6 0.285 0.138 89.6 0.279 0.133 89.2
Adv. G. Training 0.125 0.032 15.6 0.317 0.183 96 0.319 0.186 95.2
Adv. G+D Training 0.141 0.036 17.2 0.283 0.138 87.6 0.281 0.136 87.6
Adv. G. Train. + Blur 0.138 0.039 21.6 0.225 0.100 63.2 0.224 0.099 61.2
Adv. G+D Train. + Blur 0.116 0.026 10.4 0.184 0.062 36.8 0.184 0.062 37.2
blurring being used for pre-processing. In particular, low magnitude blurring can
render a disruption useless while preserving the quality of the image translation
output. We show an example on the StarGAN architecture in Fig. 5.
If the image manipulator is using blur to deter adversarial disruptions, the
adversary might not know what type and magnitude of blur are being used. In
this Section, we evaluate our proposed spread-spectrum adversarial disruption
which seeks to evade blur defenses in a gray-box scenario, with high transfer-
ability between types and magnitudes of blur. In Fig. 6 we present the propor-
tion of test images successfully disrupted (L2 ≥ 0.05) for our spread-spectrum
method, a white-box perfect knowledge disruption, an adaptation of EoT [3] to
the blur scenario and a disruption which does not use any evasion method. We
notice that both our method and EoT defeat diverse magnitudes and types of
blur and achieve relatively similar performance. Our method achieves better per-
formance on the Gaussian blur scenarios with high magnitude of blur, whereas
EoT outperforms our method on the box blur cases, on average. Our iterative
spread-spectrum method is roughly K times faster than EoT since it only has
to perform one forward-backward pass per iteration of I-FGSM instead of K to
compute the loss. Additionally, in Fig. 7, we present random qualitative samples,
which show the effectiveness of our method over a naive disruption.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a novel approach to defend against image translation-
based deepfake generation. Instead of trying to detect whether an image has
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Fig. 6: Proportion of disrupted images (L2 ≥ 0.05) for different blur evasions
under different blur defenses.
Fig. 7: An example of our spread-spectrum evasion of blur defenses for a Gaussian
blur (σ = 1.5). The first row shows a naive disruption, the second row shows our
spread-spectrum evasion and the last row shows a white-box disruption.
been modified after the fact, we defend against the non-authorized manipulation
by disrupting conditional image translation facial manipulation networks using
adapted adversarial attacks.
We operationalized our definition of a successful disruption, which allowed
us to formulate an ideal disruption that can be undertaken using traditional ad-
versarial attack methods such as FGSM, I-FGSM and PGD. We demonstrated
that this disruption is superior to other alternatives. Since many face modifica-
tion networks are conditioned on a target attribute, we proposed two disruptions
which transfer from one attribute to another and showed their effectiveness over
naive disruptions. In addition, we proposed adversarial training for GANs, which
is a first step towards image translation networks that are resistant to disruption.
Finally, blurring is an effective defense against naive disruptions in a gray-box
scenario and can allow a malicious actor to bypass the disruption and modify the
image. We presented a spread-spectrum disruption which evades a wide range
of blur defenses.
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